TALKING POINTS -- the Azores Pseudo-Summit

 16 March 2003  by Phyllis Bennis

  1) Bush's statement following his brief meeting with Blair and Aznar was   an ultimatum to the United Nations, not to Iraq. "Tomorrow is a moment of   truth for the world" refers to a final insistence that other countries and   the UN comply with U.S. demands that they endorse war. There is no longer   any attention being paid to Iraqi compliance or non-compliance, or to the   success or failure of the inspectors; disarmament, indeed Iraq itself, are   no longer part of the diplomatic equation.

    2) The desperate nature of the Azores meeting demonstrates how isolated   the U.S.-UK position is, and how isolated Tony Blair is in defending it.     3) Stating that a decision to back a U.S. war represents the "only   effective way of supporting peace and security," demonstrates that the Bush   administration has abandoned diplomacy. And no one has the right to abandon   diplomacy in favor of choosing an elective war.

    4) In Bush's speech he never mentioned the UN inspectors. This indicates   that despite claims that the Azores meeting was a "last chance for   diplomacy" rather than a war summit, there is no serious consideration of   the accomplishments of UNMOVIC and the IAEA overall, and thus no way Iraq's   current improved levels of cooperation can have any effect. There was also   no mention of Iraq having provided the inspectors (Thursday) with a new   long document dealing with the destruction of VX material.

    5) Bush said that the U.S. will "bring economic sanctions to a swift   close" AFTER the "liberation" of Iraq, meaning after the overthrow of the   regime. Another piece of evidence the U.S. has no intention of abiding by   the actual terms of the disarmament resolution (687) which requires lifting   sanctions when disarmament is complete, NOT having anything to do with   "regime change."

    5) Chirac repeated he will veto any resolution that authorizes war. It is   not clear whether, if France's bottom line demand for a somewhat longer   timetable is met, Chirac would accept another resolution that uses language   like that in 1441 -- implying the use of force, but not explicitly   authorizing it.

    6) Aznar's focus solely on the "trans-Atlantic link" between Europe and   the U.S., indicated again that much of the debate over this war actually   reflects greater concern for what the U.S. is up to than how dangerous Iraq   might be.

    7) Hans Blix's response to the British proposal indicates it is not   serious. Blix said if only ten days time were allowed (the outside limit in   the British proposal) to finish disarmament, there could be only "token   fulfillment" by Iraq of any of the requirements of 1441.     8) If Bush and Blair were serious about giving diplomacy a final chance,   they would have met in urgent weekend session at UN headquarters, WITH   other governments, WITH Kofi Annan, WITH representatives of regional   organizations including the Arab League, etc.

    9) There is obviously a difference between U.S.-UK position, and that of   all the other countries, regarding whether 1441's language of "severe   consequences" in fact means an automatic trigger for war; Washington and   London say yes, everyone else says no. But in such a case, the key   authority lies in the last line of the last article of the resolution: "the   Security Council remains seized of the issue." In UN diplo-speak, that   means the issue remains under the authority and jurisdiction of the   Council, and no individual member state can unilaterally take it over.

    10) At this moment (late Sunday evening) the "most likely" scenario is   impossible to predict. There will be a Council meeting on Monday at 3:00,   ostensibly to vote on some version of the original U.S.-UK-Spanish   proposal, amended so that instead of calling for Iraqi compliance by March   17, it will identify another date, perhaps the 27th. It is not certain   whether the version of the resolution put before the Council on Monday will   in fact be a once-and-for-all vote. It is possible the resolution put on   the table will be quite different from the original draft, could even   reflect some level of agreement from France and Germany (and therefore   Russia, China & the Uncommitted Six).   As of Sunday night Blix was still saying he expects to provide an updated   briefing for the Council on Tuesday. It is not clear whether he   anticipates having the new document on destruction of WMD material   translated by that time or not. In the 20 hours or so between the end of   the summit and the Monday afternoon meeting, the U.S. pressure, ratcheting   up from arm-twisting to leg-breaking, is certainly escalating.   There could be, though it is unlikely, a U.S. decision to avoid the final   vote till the re-scheduled compliance date (March 27 or whatever). There   could be, though it is unlikely, French acquiescence to a new U.S.-UK   proposal that might have a "more rational" timeline, as the French said   they wanted, but might even include some covert form of automaticity.   What is not so clear is whether there is any potential compromise that the   Bush administration would be willing to accept. The most likely scenario is   one based on Bush himself wanting a war.

    Alternative scenarios --

  11) If the U.S. either withdraws the resolution without a vote, or it gets   defeated in the Council, the U.S. is prepared to go to war even without   Britain if necessary. However, such a development would make the illegal,   Charter-violating nature of the war unmistakable.

    12) That might be enough to encourage one or more countries in the General   Assembly (perhaps part of the Non-Aligned leadership, such as South Africa   and Malaysia together) to apply the Uniting for Peace precedent which   allows the Assembly to take up an issue of peace and security that   ordinarily is restricted to Council consideration. The UforP resolution   (see the Center for Constitutional Rights sample draft) could condemn the   U.S. war, identify it as a threat to peace and security, call for immediate   UN negotiations, explicitly reject any claim that it is enforcing UN   resolutions, and call for an immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops, planes,   bombs, etc.

    13) Another what-if scenario could involve the refusal of UNMOVIC and/or   IAEA inspectors to leave Iraq when Bush gives his official 72-hour warning   (Powell suggested Sunday morning that it might be time already for the   inspectors to get ready to leave -- a remark Blix snapped was not   appropriate to be made in the media). What if Blix and Kofi Annan   together refused to order the withdrawal of the inspectors, or said they   could not order the withdrawal since the inspectors work for the Council,   or if the inspectors themselves announced they were refusing to leave their   post as long as their disarmament work was proceeding? Such a statement   might indicate that a global mandate for disarmament is not to be taken   lightly, that the threat of an unlawful, unauthorized war by one member   state should not be the basis for abandoning one's post when the work is   proceeding, that only the UN should decide about suspending the inspections   and that such a decision should not be based on threats of an illegal war.   Would the Bush administration be prepared to launch their war with 150 or   200 inspectors circulating around the country? It is certainly possible   the answer is yes -- and it is not likely something any UN official could   demand of the inspection teams. But given the stakes anticipated by UN and   other casualty estimates, it may be the kind of desperate gamble, carried   out by inspectors on their own volition, that takes on unexpected   legitimacy because so many lives are at risk.

 

Under the "Uniting for peace" resolution adopted by the General Assembly in November 1950, the Assembly may take action if the Security Council, because of a lack of unanimity of its permanent members, fails to act in a case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Assembly is empowered to consider the matter immediately with a view to making recommendations to Members for collective measures, including, in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression, the use of armed force when necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

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